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Abstract
In this paper, we show the equivalency of weak and strong secrecy conditions for a
large class of secure network coding problems. When we restrict to linear operations, we
show the equivalency of “perfect secrecy and zero-error constraints” with “weak secrecy
and ǫ-error constraints”.
1 Introduction
Reliable and secure communication requires low error probability and low information leak-
age. But there are different metrics for error probability and information leakage (such as
weak, strong, or perfect secrecy). Two important reliability metrics are ǫ or zero proba-
bility of error. An ǫ-error criterion requires the (average or maximal) error probability to
vanish as the blocklength increases, while a zero-error criterion, demands the error to be
exactly zero for every given bloklength. Three important security metrics are weak, strong,
or perfect secrecy. A weak notion of secrecy requires the percentage of the message that is
leaked to vanish as the code blocklength increases, while a strong notion of secrecy requires
the total amount of leaked information (not its percentage) to vanish as the blocklength
increases. Perfect secrecy requires absolutely zero leakage of information, for every given
bloklength.
These reliability and security metrics lead to different notions of capacity which could
be quite different. For instance, zero-error capacity, which was originally introduced by
Shannon [1], could be zero in a point-to-point channel, while the ǫ-error could be non-zero
for the same channel. One can then ask “how capacity behaves under different reliability
and security metrics?” There are some previous works that address this interesting question.
In [2,3], the authors showed that in the network coding problem with co-located sources, the
rate region does not increase by relaxing zero-error to ǫ-error condition. Maurer et al. in [4]
proved the rate region equivalency of weak and strong secure conditions in the source model
secret key agreement problem. In [5], the equivalency of weak and perfect secrecy conditions
∗This work was partially supported by Iran National Science Foundation (INSF) under contract No.
92/32575.
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C = f(M,K)
K = {K,K1, · · · ,Kt}
M = {M1, · · · ,Mt}
Eavesdropper
g1(C,S1,K,K1) M1
K,K1,S1
g2(C,S2,K,K2) M2
K,K2,S2
gt(C,St,K,Kt) Mt
K,Kt,St
Figure 1: The schematic of perfectly secure index coding problem. This is a generalization of Shannon’s
cypher system [18] to an index coding setup, which was introduced by Birk and Kol [19] in the context
of satellite communication and studied further in [19–28]. In the secure index coding problem, there is a
transmitter sending t messages M1,M2, · · · ,Mt to the t legitimate receivers in the presence of an eavesdrop-
per. Each receiver i, i ∈ [t] has a side information set Si which is a subset of messages {M1,M2, · · · ,Mt}
except Mi. Furthermore, there is a common key K shared among all the legitimate parties, and private
keys K1,K2, · · · ,Kt shared between the transmitter and each of the receivers. The transmitter applies a
(randomized) function on the messages and keys to compute the public code C. Then, C is broadcast, and
all the receivers including the eavesdropper can hear C. Each receiver i applies a function on the information
available to it, namely K, Ki and messages in Si to compute Mi. The goal is to find the minimum number of
information bits that should be broadcast by the server so that each client can recover its desired messages
with zero-error probability, and further, eavesdropper could not retrieve any information about the messages
by having C (perfect secrecy).
(with ǫ-error probability) for the secure index coding problem is shown. Moreover, it is
shown that zero-error probability could be achieved at the cost of a multiplicative constant.
To the best of our knowledge, no other work except [5] has concentrated on the equivalency
of weak and perfect secrecy. But the setup of this problem, reviewed in Fig. 1, is restricted.
For instance, the adversary is assumed to have full access to the communication links and
the shared keys are either shared between pairs of nodes, or all of the nodes (no key is
shared between subsets of size three for instance). Furthermore, the network topology of
index coding is a special case of wireline networks. While there are many works addressing
the security aspects of wireline networks [6–17] in various settings, as far as we know, none
of the works in the literature study how the secrecy region changes with different criteria in
secrecy constraints in the secure network coding problem. Nonetheless, important aspects
of secure communication such as secure throughput in the presence of an active adversary
who can corrupt a limited number of links has been considered. For more details about the
works in the secure network coding problem, one can refer to [16].
Our contribution: In this paper, we consider a general wireline network consisting of
sources, intermediate nodes, and sinks, which are interconnected by error-free links. The
links are directional with given capacities. Thus, wireline network can be represented by a
directed weighted graph. This graph is allowed to have directed cycles. The source nodes
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have messages that are desired by sink nodes. Moreover, nodes in the network have access to
infinite private randomness (only available to the nodes themselves), and also a number of
rate-limited shared keys. Each key is shared among a subset of source, relay or destination
nodes. These secret keys are helpful in hiding the messages from an eavesdropper who has
access to a subset of links.
Our main result is to show that changing weak to perfect condition and ǫ-error to zero-
error constraint, does not affect the achievable secure rate region of linear network coding
(if nodes are restricted to linear operations). When the nodes are allowed to do non-linear
operations, we show that weak and strong secrecy are equivalent.
Notation: Random variables are denoted by capital letters and their values by lower-
case letters. We use [k] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , k}. For a given subset S ⊂ [t] and a se-
quence of random variables M1,M2, · · · ,Mt, we useMS to also denote the set {Mi : i ∈ S}.
When S = [t] is the full set, instead of M[t] we also use bold font to denote full sets, or
its vector form, i.e., we use M to either denote the message set {M1,M2, · · · ,Mt}, or the
vector
[
M1,M2, · · · ,Mt
]
. Whether M is a set or a vector is clarified in the context. The
total variation distance between two pmfs pX and qX is defined as
‖pX − qX‖1 =
1
2
∑
x
|pX(x)− qX(x)|.
We use 1[·] to denote the indicator function; it is equal to one if the condition inside [·]
holds; otherwise it is zero. Finally, all the logarithms in this paper are in base two.
2 Definitions
We assume that there are t messages M1,M2, · · · ,Mt. Let us denote the set of all messages
by M = {M1,M2, · · · ,Mt}. As shown in the Fig. 2, the wireline network we consider in
this paper consists of source nodes, receiver nodes (sink nodes) and some intermediate relay
nodes. The nodes (source, sink and intermediate nodes) are interconnected by error-free
point-to-point links. In addition, there exists an eavesdropper who is able to hear some of
the links. Each source node has access to a subset of messages. Similarly, each sink node
desires to obtain a subset of messages. The source and sink nodes are part of the wireline
network.
There is also a set of keysK = {K1,K2, · · · ,K∆} of limited rates, each of which is shared
among a subset of the nodes. Hence, every node can use its available keys for encoding.
Moreover, each source or relay nodes can use a private randomness. Let us denote the set
of all private randomness vectors by the set W = {W1,W2, · · · ,WΘ}. Random variables
M1,M2, · · · ,Mt,K1,K2, · · · ,K∆,W1,W2, · · · ,WΘ are mutually independent and uniform
over their alphabet sets.
The edges of the wireline network have limited capacity. For a code of blocklength n,
an edge with capacity Ce can carry at most n(Ce+ ǫn) bits where ǫn converges to zero as n
tends to infinity. Similarly, if the rate of message Mi is RMi , then in a code of blocklength
n, Mi is a binary sequence of length nRMi . The same can be said of the rate of the
shared keys RKi . The goal of the nodes of the network is to maximize the communication
rates RMi while minimizing the key rates RKi as much as possible in such a way that the
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Intermediate nodes and error-free directed links
S1
S2
St
Sources
D1
D2
Du
Sinks
Figure 2: The directed graph representation of a wireline network. Nodes of the network are connected to
each other via directed links of limited capacity. The directed graph is allowed to have cycles. In this figure,
there are t source nodes and u sink nodes. The models allows for shared secret keys between various subsets
of the nodes. Each node produces its outputs on its ongoing links based on its inputs, shared keys and its
own private randomness.
desired reliability (error probability condition at sinks) and security conditions are met.1
The resulting fundamental trade-off between RMi and RKi describes the capacity region of
the problem.
Fixing a coding strategy by the nodes in the network, the eavesdropper will end up with
a collection of observations from the network. We use the random variable C to denote all
the information the eavesdropped has obtained. Random variable C is a function of M, K
and W,
C = f(M,K,W).
Linear Network Coding:
In linear network coding, we assume that there is a finite field F. Each variable Mi,
Ki and Wi is a string of independent and uniformly distributed symbols from field F. All
the coding operations are restricted to taking weighted linear combinations in F. Then,
eavesdropper’s information C can be expressed as
C = AM+BK+GW, (1)
for some matrices A, B and G where
M =
[
M1,M2, · · · ,Mt
]T
K =
[
K1,K2, · · · ,K∆
]T
W =
[
W1,W2, · · · ,WΘ
]T
.
Decoding conditions:
1Private randomness is commonly considered as a free resource and studying its rate is not of interest.
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– Zero-error decoding
Each receiver is able to decode its desired messages with exactly zero-error probability
for every given blocklength.
– ǫ-error decoding
Each receiver is able to recover its desired message with vanishing probability of error
as the blocklength grows.
Secrecy conditions:
– Perfect Secrecy
Assuming that random variables K1,K2, · · · ,K∆,W1,W2, · · · ,WΘ are mutually inde-
pendent and uniform over their alphabet sets, the conditional pmf p(C = c|M = m)
should not depend on the value of m, for any given c. Equivalently, for any distribu-
tion on input message set M, we should have
I(M;C) = 0, ∀pM(m), (2)
as long as the message set M, the key set K and private randomness set W are
mutually independent.
– Strong secrecy
In strong secrecy, the independence between M and C no longer exists. There are
two definitions of ǫ-strong secrecy in the literature [29] [30, Lemma 1]: given ǫ1 > 0,
the first definition requires that
I(M;C) ≤ ǫ1. (3)
The above equation can be also expressed in terms of KL divergence:
D(pMC||pMpC) ≤ ǫ1.
The second definition of strong secrecy requires a bound on the total variation distance
(instead of KL divergence). Given some ǫ2 > 0, we require
‖pMC − pMpC‖1 ≤ ǫ2. (4)
Remark 1. (Connection between the two definitions). We claim that strong secrecy
in terms of mutual information implies strong secrecy in terms of total variation
distance, i.e., ǫ1 being small implies that ǫ2 is also small. The reverse is also true
if one can show that strong secrecy in terms of total variation distance holds with
an exponentially vanishing ǫ2. To show this, let us denote the alphabet set of M by
M. It follows from [30, Lemma 1] that if ǫ1-strong secrecy of the first definition, and
ǫ2-strong secrecy of the second definition hold, then
log2 e
2
ǫ22 ≤ ǫ1 ≤ ǫ2 log
|M|
ǫ2
,
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provided that |M| > 4. Hence, if ǫ1 becomes small, ǫ2 also becomes small. For the
reverse direction, assume that message Mi takes values in {1, 2, · · · , 2
nRi} where n is
the blocklength and Ri is the rate of the i-th message. Then log|M| = n
∑
iRi. If we
can ensure that the value of ǫ2 decreases exponentially fast in blocklength n, then nǫ2
converges to zero as n becomes large, and ǫ2 log (|M|/ǫ2) will also converge to zero.
This will imply that ǫ1 vanishes as n tends to infinity.
– Weak secrecy
Similar to strong secrecy, M and C are not independent, instead of (2) and (3), we
say that ǫ-weak secrecy holds if:
I(M;C) ≤ ǫ ·H(M). (5)
It follows from the above definitions that perfect secrecy condition (2) is stronger than
strong secrecy condition (3), which in turn is stronger than weak secrecy constraint (5).
3 Main Results
3.1 Results for linear codes
Theorem 1 (From strong secrecy to perfect secrecy for linear codes). Take an arbitrary
linear code C , with adversary observing
C = AM+BK+GW,
as defined in (1). If each of the strong secrecy constraints hold for some ǫ < 1, i.e., either
of
I(M;C) ≤ ǫ,
or
‖pMC − pMpC‖1 ≤ ǫ.
hold for some ǫ < 1/2, then the code C is also perfect secure, i.e., I(M;C) = 0.
Proof. Assume that I(M;C) > 0 whereC = AM+BK+GW.We will show that I(M;C) ≥
1 and ‖pMC − pMpC‖1 ≥ 1/2. This will conclude the proof.
Assume that C is a column vector of size k. We claim that one can find a non-zero
column vector z of size k such that z†B = z†G = 0 are the zero vector, but z†A 6= 0
where † is the transpose operator. If this is not the case, the equation z†[B,G] = 0 implies
that z†[A,B,G] = 0, showing that the null space [B,G]† is the same as the null space of
[A,B,G]†. Hence, the rank of the matrix [A,B,G] is equal to the rank of [B,G]. Thus, the
image of the matrix A is a subset of the image of [B,G]. Let us call the image of [B,G] by
I , which is a linear subspace of Fk. Since elements of vectors K and W are independently
and uniformly distributed over F, BK + GW will be uniformly distributed over I . Just
like Shannon’s one-time-pad strategy, this will imply that C = AM+ (BK+GW) will be
independent of AM, and masked by BK + GW. To see this, note that for any value of
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M =m, we have Am ∈ I and the vectorC = Am+BK+GW will be uniformly distributed
over I as well. This is because I = Am + I since I is a linear subspace. As a result,
the conditional distribution p(C|m) does not depend on the value of m. Hence, perfect
secrecy condition holds. But this contradicts our assumption that I(M;C) > 0. Thus, we
can conclude that there is a non-zero column vector z of size k such that z†B = z†G = 0
are the zero vector, but z†A 6= 0. This implies that z†C = z†AM 6= 0.
Now, observe that
I(M;C) ≥ I(M; z†C)
= I(M; z†AM)
= H(z†AM)
(a)
= log |F|
≥ 1,
where in (a), we used the fact that M has uniform distribution, and hence (z†A)M is a
uniformly distributed symbol in F.
Next, defining functions mˆ = f(m) = z†Am and cˆ = g(c) = z†c = f(m), observe that
Mˆ = Cˆ is a uniform symbol in F. Then, we can write
‖pM,C − pM · pC‖1
(a)
≥ ‖p
Mˆ,Cˆ
− p
Mˆ
· p
Cˆ
‖1
=
1
2
∑
a,b∈F
|1[a = b]×
1
|F|
−
1
|F|2
|
=
|F|(|F| − 1)
|F|2
=
(
1−
1
|F|
)
≥
1
2
.
where 1[·] is the indicator function, and step (a) follows from the data processing property
of total variation distance (see e.g. [31]), which states that for any channel p(y|x) we have
‖p(x)− q(x)‖1 ≥ ‖p(y)− q(y)‖1
where p(y) =
∑
x p(x)p(y|x) and q(y) =
∑
x q(x)p(y|x). We get our desired inequality if
we set the alphabet X to be the alphabet of (M,C), p(x) = p(m, c), q(x) = p(m)p(c),
and p(y|x) to be the application of functions f and g applied on the M and C parts of X,
respectively.
Theorem 2 (From ǫ-error to zero-error for linear codes). Take an arbitrary linear code C
over a finite field F. If the average error probability of a sink node is less than 1 − 1/|F|,
then the error probability of the sink node has to be zero.
Proof. Consider a sink node. The sink node receives a vectorY which is a linear combination
of messages, keys and private randomness symbols. In other words, we have
Y = AM+BK+GW.
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for some matrices A,B and G. The message vector M can be split into two part (M1,M2)
where M1 is the set of messages that the sink nodes wants to decode, and M2 is the
collection of other messages. Similarly, K can be split into two part (K1,K2) where K1 is
the set of secret keys that the sink nodes has, and K2 is the set of secret keys that are not
shared with the sink node. Then, we can write
Y = A1M1 +A2M2 +B1K1 +B2K2 +GW.
Since the sink has vector Y and key K1, its task is to recover M1 from
Y −B1K1 = A1M1 +A2M2 +B2K2 +GW.
Note that the sink node does not know any ofM2, K2 orW. These three variablesM2, K2
or W are mutually independent and uniform over their alphabet sets. Let Z = Y−B1K1.
Given a value for Z = z for somem1, we say that (z,m1) is a compatible pair if the equation
A2m2 +B2k2 +Gw = z−A1m1 (6)
has a solution in variables m2,k2,w.
Given a pair (z,m1), two possibilities might occur
• The pair (z,m1) are not compatible. In this case, p(m1|z) = 0 and the sink is certain
that its intended message is not equal to m1.
• The pair (z,m1) are compatible, and the equation
A2m2 +B2k2 +Gw = z−A1m1 (7)
has at least one solution for m2,k2,w. Then, note that the number of solutions
(m2,k2,w) that satisfy (7) is fixed and determined by the dimension of the null space
of matrix [A2, B2, G]. Since M2, K2 and W are mutually independent and uniform,
p(m1|z) is equal to the number of solutions (m2,k2,w) of (7), divided by the total
number of triples (m2,k2,w). This implies that from the perspective of the sink that
has vector z, all the messages m1 that are compatible with z are equally likely to have
been the transmitted message.
Assume that the sink’s error probability is positive. We show that for any vector z that
the sink may end up with, there are at least |F| sequences m1 that are compatible with z.
Thus, the chance of correct decoding will be at most 1/|F|. This would complete the proof.
Now, if the sink’s error probability is positive, there exists some vector z and two distinct
compatible sequences m′1 6= m
∗
1 with it, i.e., the following two equations have solutions
(m2,k2,w) and (m
′
2,k
′
2,w
′):
A2m
∗
2 +B2k
∗
2 +Gw
∗ = z−A1m
∗
1 (8)
A2m
′
2 +B2k
′
2 +Gw
′ = z−A1m
′
1 (9)
By subtracting these two equations, we get that for m′′1 =m
∗
1 −m
′
1 6= 0, the equation
A2m
′′
2 +B2k
′′
2 +Gw
′′ = −A1m
′′
1 (10)
8
has a solution (m′′2 ,k
′′
2 ,w
′′) = (m∗2,k
∗
2,w
∗)− (m′2,k
′
2,w
′).
Now take any vector z that the sink may end up with, and let m1 be the true message
sequence that is compatible with z. We claim that z is also compatible with m1 + αm
′′
1
for any α ∈ F. This follows from multiplying both sides of (10) by α and then adding it
up with (6). Since m′′1 6= 0, the sequences m1 + αm
′′
1 for different values of α are distinct
vectors. Since α has |F| possibilities, this shows that there are at least |F| sequences m1
that are compatible with z.
3.2 Result for linear and non-linear codes
Given message rates RMi , i = 1, 2, . . . , t and key rates RKi for i = 1, 2, . . . ,∆, we say
that these message and key rates are asymptotically weakly secure achievable if there is
a sequence of codes Cj whose message and key rates converge to RMi , i = 1, 2, . . . , t and
RKi for i = 1, 2, . . . ,∆ as j tends to infinity, and furthermore, Cj is ǫj-weakly secure, i.e.,
satisfying
I(M;C) ≤ ǫjH(M),
for some vanishing sequence ǫj → 0 as j tends to infinity. We say that the given message
and key rates are asymptotically weakly secure achievable with linear codes if one can find
a sequence of linear codes Cj with the above properties.
We say that message rates RMi , i = 1, 2, . . . , t and key rates RKi for i = 1, 2, . . . ,∆, are
asymptotically strongly secure achievable if a similar condition holds except that we require
Cj to be ǫj-strongly secure
I(M;C) ≤ ǫj,
for some vanishing sequence ǫj. Asymptotically strongly secure achievable rates with linear
codes are defined similarly.
Theorem 3 (From weak secrecy to strong secrecy for linear and non-linear codes). Any
message and key rates RMi and RKi that is asymptotically weakly secure achievable, is
also asymptotically strongly secure achievable. Also, any message and key rates RMi and
RKi that is asymptotically weakly secure achievable with linear codes is also asymptotically
strongly secure achievable with linear codes.
In order to prove the above theorem, we need tools from random binning of sources that
are given in Appendix A.
Proof of Theorem 3. We begin by providing the high level structure of the proof.
High level structure of the proof: Suppose we have a code C satisfying the weak
secrecy condition with parameter ǫa, i.e.,
I(M;C) ≤ ǫa ·H(M). (11)
Also assume that the error probability of the code is ǫb. Then, we construct a sequence
of strongly-secure codes C ′n whose information leakage vanishes as n tends to infinity. The
message rates of C ′n converge to a number that is at least RMi − β, and the key rates of C
′
n
converge to a number that is at most RKi +β. Here β is a constant that depends only on ǫa
and ǫb. Furthermore, β converges to zero as ǫa and ǫb converge to zero. Constructing this
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sequence of strongly secure codes completes the proof. This sequence of codes is constructed
by repeating the original code C and properly appending the repeated code.
Some definitions: Assume that there are u sink nodes and message Mi is desired by
sinks Ti ⊆ [u]. Let us denote by Mˆij to be the reconstruction of Mi by sink j ∈ Ti. Since
the error probability of the code C is ǫb, By Fano’s inequality, we have
H(Mi|Mˆij) ≤ h(ǫb) + ǫb log |Mi|, ∀j ∈ Ti. (12)
Let δi = h(ǫb) + ǫb log |Mi|, and
δ = max
i∈[t]
δi. (13)
If we fix the coding operations at all nodes, the output reconstructions and eavesdropper’s
information will be functions of the message M, secret key K and private randomness W:
(Mˆ,C) = g(M,K,W).
Independent repetitions of the code C : Assume that we independently run the
above code n times. In other words, instead of considering one copy of message Mi,
assume that n i.i.d. copies Mi(1),Mi(2), · · · ,Mi(n) exist for i ∈ [t]. For each of the
n copies of the messages, we run the given code and the sinks produce reconstructions
Mˆij(1), Mˆij(2), · · · , Mˆij(n) for i ∈ [t], j ∈ Ti. We call this expansion n i.i.d. repetitions of
the code and denote it by C n. Observe that the rate of the expanded code C n is equal to
the rate of the original code C , because even though the links in the network are used n
times a single code, but the message communicated over the network is also multiplied by n.
Similarly, the rates of secret keys shared among the network nodes remain unchanged. By
summing up the weak secrecy conditions I(M(i);C(i)) ≤ ǫa ·H(M(i)) for each repetition
of the code, we obtain that
I(M([n]);C([n])) ≤ ǫa ·H(M([n])),
where M([n]) = {M(1),M(2), . . . ,M(n)} is the collection of all messages of C n. We see
that the weak secrecy condition holds with the same parameter ǫa for C
n. However, the
error probability of the expanded code C n is higher, because C n will be in error if an
error occurs in any of the n iterations of the code. Nonetheless, by properly appending the
expanded space provided by C n, we not only bring down the error probability, but also go
from weak secrecy to strong secrecy at the cost of sacrificing an asymptotically vanishing
reduction in message rates.
We can represent the expanded code C n by i.i.d. variables (Mˆ(i),C(i),M(i),K(i),W(i))
for i ∈ [n], and follows that
(Mˆ(i),C(i)) = g(M(i),K(i),W(i)).
Informal sketch of the proof: Since the formal proof involves several technical details
that might clutter the flow of ideas, we begin by the informal sketch of the proof to convey
the essential ideas. The formal proof is given afterwards. Below, we use the term “small”
informally to mainly denote a term that vanishes as ǫa and ǫb converge to zero.
Via a binning argument, we find two appropriate functions of Mi([n]), namely M˜i and
Fi for i ∈ [t], such that
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i) The alphabet size of variable Fi is small for any i ∈ [t].
ii) Random variable M˜i is almost uniformly distributed. Since M˜i is a function ofMi([n]),
multiple sequences mi([n]) may be mapped to the same m˜i. We construct the function
M˜i such that the number of Mi([n]) that are mapped to each realization of M˜i is
small. Hence M˜i is in an approximate one-to-one map with Mi([n]), and the entropy
of random variable M˜i is almost equal to the entropy of Mi([n]) for any i ∈ [t].
iii) Let us use M˜ and F to denote the collection of M˜i and Fi for i ∈ [t], respectively. Let
C˜ = (C([n]),F). Then, M˜ and C˜ are almost mutually independent. In particular,
there is some η > 0 such that
‖p
M˜C˜
− p
M˜
p
C˜
‖1 ≤ 2
−ηn. (14)
iv) Given j ∈ Ti, as mentioned above, error probability P(Mi([n]) 6= Mˆij([n])) can become
large when n becomes large; this is because the expanded code will be in error if an
error occurs in any of the n iterations of the code. However, variable Fi is such
that one can recover Mi([n]) from Fi and reconstruction Mˆij([n]) for any j ∈ Ti with
very high probability. In other words, once given Fi, it is possible to use the n noisy
reconstructions Mˆij([n]) to recover Mi([n]) with high probability. Thus, providing
the additional variable Fi to the receivers will be used to resolve the error probability
issue.
Now, we show that how finding M˜i and Fi with the above properties completes the proof.
Since Mi([n]) are mutually independent for i ∈ [t], we have that M˜i’s are also mutually
independent for i ∈ [t]. We view M˜i as the messages for the new code C˜ that we construct.
Thus, each source node that was receiving message Mi, is now receiving M˜i as the i-th
message. But to be able to exploit the original expanded code C n, we need to createMi([n])
from M˜i. To do this, we consider the channel pMi([n])|M˜i , and pass M˜i through this channel
to simulate Mi([n]). Since Mi([n]) is uniformly distributed, this simulation is nothing but
looking at sequences Mi([n]) that are mapped to the same M˜i, and choosing uniformly at
random from them. Since the i-th message M˜i may be available at multiple source nodes,
we should make sure that they all create the same Mi([n]). To do this, we assume an
additional common key is shared among the source nodes to make this coordination. The
rate of this extra key will be shown to vanish in the limit by using property (ii). The source
nodes can use this shared key to simulate the channel p
Mi([n])|M˜i
, and pass M˜i to obtain
one common copy of Mi([n]). Having simulated Mi([n]), the nodes can find Fi (which is a
function of Mi([n])).
Once Mi([n])’s are simulated, we can use the encoding and decoding operations of C
n.
This allows the sinks to produce reconstructions Mˆij(1), Mˆij(2), · · · , Mˆij(n). Next, Fi’s are
also sent from source nodes to sink nodes via the network links. Since the entropy rates
of Fi’s are vanishing, we do not violate the link capacities asymptotically. From property
(iv) given above, this will allow sinks to decode their intended messages with vanishing
error probability. From property (iii) given above, strong secrecy condition (total variation
distance definition) holds even if eavesdropper also gets to learn Fi’s in addition to C([n]).
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Since the total variation distance drops exponentially fast in n, from Remark 1, we get
strong secrecy condition in the sense of vanishing mutual information. This will complete
the proof.
Formal proof:
Step 1: Construction of M˜i and Fi for i ∈ [t]:
Let Ri = log |Mi|. This quantity is proportional to RMi of code C . In fact, if code C
consists of k uses of the network, then RMi = Ri/k is the message sent per network use.
Let
R˜i = Ri − 2ǫa ·H(M)− 2δ, (15)
RFi = 2δ, (16)
where δ was defined in (13).
Observe that the repetitions of message Mi, i.e., Mi([n]) has alphabet set M
n
i . We
consider two independent binnings of Mni , one into 2
nR˜i bins and another into 2nRFi bins.
These binnings are done randomly and independently. Applying the (random) binning
mapping to Mi([n]), let us denote the bin indices by M˜i and Fi, respectively. The binning
mappings can be linear or non-linear depending on whether we are proving the theorem for
linear or non-linear case.
According to Theorem 5 given in the appendix, if for any S ⊆ [t], the binning rate vector
(R˜1, RF1 , R˜2, RF2 , · · · , R˜t, RFt)
satisfies the following inequality,∑
i∈S
R˜i +RFi < H(MS |C) = H(MS)− I(MS ;C)
=
∑
i∈S
Ri − I(MS ;C), (17)
then, one can find κ > 0 such that for sufficiently large enough n
E‖P
M˜FC([n])
− pU
M˜
pUFpC([n])‖1 ≤ 2
−κn (18)
where the expected value is over all random binning mappings and pU is the uniform
distribution. Observe that (17) holds by the choice of R˜i and RFi given in (15) and (16).
The reason is that
∑
i∈S
R˜i +RFi =
(∑
i∈S
Ri
)
− 2ǫa|S| ·H(M)
(a)
≤
(∑
i∈S
Ri
)
− ǫa|S| ·H(M)− |S| · I(M;C)
≤
(∑
i∈S
Ri
)
− ǫa|S| ·H(M)− I(MS ;C)
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<(∑
i∈S
Ri
)
− I(MS ;C),
where (a) follows from (11).
Next, we want to define some Slepian-Wolf decoders. Csisza´r in [32, Theorem 1,3] proves
the existence of error exponents for the the Slepian-Wolf theorem [33] for random non-linear
and linear binning. This result implies that we can recover Mi([n]) from bin index Fi and
side information Mˆij([n]) for any j ∈ Ti with error probability of at most 2
−nβi for some
βi > 0 if
RFi > H(Mi|Mˆij),
and n is sufficiently large. Note that the probability of success of the Slepian-Wolf decoder is
with respect to random binning (computed by taking the statistical average over all random
binnings). Observe that RFi given in (16) satisfies this inequality because of (12) and (13).
Let
RGi = 2ǫa ·H(M) + 3δ. (19)
Because RGi + R˜i > H(Mi), by Theorem 7, one can simulate the channel pMi([n])|M˜i
using
randomness of rate RGi within an average total variation distance of at most 2
−nζi for some
ζi > 0.
We claim that there is a deterministic binning such that for some η > 0,
• (i) We have
‖p
M˜FC([n])
− pU
M˜
pUFpC([n])‖1 ≤ 2
−ηn. (20)
• (ii) For any i, with probability 1 − 2−ηn, one can recover Mi([n]) from bin index Fi
and side information Mˆij([n]) for any j ∈ Ti.
• (iii) For any i, one can simulate the channel p
Mi([n])|M˜i
using randomness of rate RGi
within a total variation distance of at most 2−nη.
The reason is that we know the average of the sum of the total variation distance of (20),
plus the error probabilities of the Slepian-Wolf decoders, plus the total variation distance
of the channel simulator converges to zero (exponentially fast) over all random instances.
Hence, there must exist a deterministic binning (a fixing of binnings) that makes this total
sum converge to zero (exponentially fast).
Step 2: Completing the proof using M˜i and Fi for i ∈ [t]:
We construct a new code C˜ as follows: the i-th message is denoted by M˜i and is
uniformly distributed over a set of size 2nR˜i . The nodes of the network also have shared
keys of the same length as they have in C n. Additionally, the source nodes who obtain
the i-th message M˜i, are assumed to share a common secret key of rate RGi . This secret
key is used by them to simulate the same channel p
Mi([n])|M˜i
. The source nodes pass their
messages M˜i through this channel to produceMi([n]). Having producedMi([n]), the nodes
can find Fi (which is a function of Mi([n])). Furthermore, with their simulated Mi([n]),
we can use the encoding and decoding operations of C n. This gives the adversary random
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variable C([n]). Furthermore, the source nodes send variables Fi through the network links.
This comes at a negligible additional cost since RFi can be made arbitrarily small. This
gives the adversary random variables C([n]) and F.
Secrecy and reliability analysis: Observe that the induced pmf on M˜i,Mi([n]) and Fi is
as follows:
pU
M˜
· p˜
M([n]) | M˜
· pF,C([n]) | M([n])
Since by (20),
‖pU
M˜
− p
M˜
‖1 ≤ 2
−ηn
and by (iii),
‖p
M˜
p˜
M([n])|M˜
− p
M˜
p
M([n])|M˜
‖1 ≤ 2
−ηn
using [29, Lemma 3, part 3], we get that
‖pU
M˜
· p˜
M([n])|M˜
· pF,C([n])|M([n]) − pM˜ · pM([n])|M˜ · pF,C([n])|M([n])‖1 ≤ 2× 2
−ηn.
(21)
Hence, the induced pmf of the code C˜ is very close to the induced pmf of C n with M˜i and
Fi created as deterministic bin indices of Mi([n]). From (20), we can then conclude that
in the new code C˜ , the message vector M˜ is almost independent of F,C([n]). Since the
strong secrecy condition (total variation distance definition) holds with the total variation
distance dropping exponentially fast in n, from Remark 1, we get strong secrecy condition
in the sense of vanishing mutual information between M˜ and F,C([n]).
The sink nodes use the encoding and decoding operations of C n. This allows the sinks
to produce reconstructions Mˆij(1), Mˆij(2), · · · , Mˆij(n). Since Fi’s are also sent from source
nodes to sink nodes via the network links, from property (ii) given above, the sinks can
decode their intended messages with vanishing error probability. This completes the proof.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered a setup which contains t transmitter, u receivers and some
intermediate nodes being connected with directed error-free point-to-point links. It is also
assumed that there exists an eavesdropper being able to hear a certain subset of links.
In order to provide secrecy, each node has access to some keys and private randomness.
Defining different conditions on decoding error and secrecy, i.e., zero and ǫ-error decoding;
and weak, strong and perfect secrecy constraints, we were seeking to find a relation between
rate regions considering different conditions. In Theorem 1, we showed that for the linear
case the rate region with strongly-secure condition is equivalent to one with perfectly-secure
constraint. Theorem 2 states the equivalency of ǫ-error to zero-error rate region for the
linear case. Moreover, we showed in Theorem 3 for general case (both linear and non-linear
regime) that relaxing the secrecy condition from strong to weak secrecy, does not change the
rate region when we have an ǫ-error decoding condition. Our conjecture is that the ǫ-error
weakly-secure rate region is equivalent to zero-error perfectly-secure one in the general case.
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A Tools from random binning
A.1 Some Definitions
Random binning: In random binning, each realization of a random variable is randomly
mapped to a bin index. Therefore, random binning is a random function like B :M→ M¯
which uniformly and independently maps each symbol m ∈ M to a symbol m¯ ∈ M¯. In
other words, B = B(m) is a uniform random variable on the set {0, 1, · · · , |M¯| − 1} and
for any m1 6= m2 ∈ M, B1 = B(m1) is independent of B2 = B(m2).
Linear random binning: In linear random binning, the mapping function B is linear.
Each (affine) linear random binning has a matrix representation of the form M¯ = AM +V ,
where A is a random matrix, and V is a random vector, all with independent and uniform
entries in F. Consider M as a sequence of symbols in the finite field F with the length of
ℓm and bin index M¯ as a sequence of length ℓm¯ in F, linear random binning matrix will be
of size Aℓm¯×ℓm and V will be of length ℓm¯.
Distributed random binning:
In distributed random binning, there are a set of random functions Bi :Mi → M¯i, i ∈
[t] where each Bi is a random binning function and Bi’s are mutually independent. Dis-
tributed linear random binning can be characterized by matrices Ai and drift terms Vi,
17
M¯i = AiMi + Vi where entries of all of Ai and Vi are mutually independent and uniform
over F. Observe that the following facts holds in a distributed linear binning: (i) uniformity
property: for any values of mi and m¯i, we have
P (Aimi + Vi = m¯i) =
1
|M¯i|
, (22)
and (ii) pairwise independence property: for any values of mi,mj , m¯i and m¯j, we have
P(Aimi + Vi = m¯i, Ajmj + Vj = m¯j) =
1
|M¯i|2
. (23)
A.2 Output Statistics of Random Binning
Output Statistics of Random Binning (OSRB) is a tool introduced in [29] to describe the
joint pmf of bin indices of multiple random variables.
Theorem 4 (OSRB Theorem - Theorem 1 in [29]). Consider dependent random vari-
ables (M1,M2, · · · ,Mt, C) with joint pmf p(m1,m2, · · · ,mt, c) on the finite alphabet set∏t
i=1Mi × C. Let M
n, Cn be n i.i.d. repetitions of (M, C) where M = (M1,M2, · · · ,Mt),
i.e.,
p(mn, cn) =
n∏
i=1
p(mi, ci).
Moreover, we assume that distributed random binning function Bi :M
n
i → M¯i = [2
nRi ], i ∈
[t] maps each sequence of Mni independently and uniformly to the bin index set [2
nRi ] that
induces the following pmf
P (mn, cn, m¯) = p(mn, cn) ·
t∏
i=1
1 [Bi(m
n
i ) = m¯i].
where mn = {mni , i ∈ [t]} and m¯ = {m¯i ∈ [2
nRi ], i ∈ [t]}. Note that P (mn, cn, m¯) shown
by capital letter is a random pmf which is equal to pmn,cn|B1,B2,··· ,Bt for each fixed binning.
According to the OSRB theorem, if for each S ⊆ [t], the binning rate vector (R1, R2, · · · , Rt)
satisfies the inequality, ∑
i∈S
Ri < H(MS |C),
the expected value of the total variation of the joint pmf P (cn, m¯) from the pcn
∏t
i=1 p
U
[2nRi ]
tends to zero as n approaches infinity:
lim
n→∞
EB‖P (c
n, m¯)− pcn
t∏
i=1
pU
[2nRi ]
‖1 → 0, (24)
In the above equation, B = {Bi, i ∈ [t]} is the set of all random functions and p
U
[2nRi ]
refers
to the uniform distribution on the bin index set [2nRi ]. The expectation in (24) is take over
random realization of the binning mappings.
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To prove our results, we state and prove the following improved version of the OSRB
theorem which states that not only the average of the total variation distance in (24)
converges to zero, but also exponentially fast:
Theorem 5. Assuming that all the random variables in the statement of Theorem 4 take
values in finite sets, the expected value of the total variation of the joint pmf P (cn, m¯) from
the pcn
∏t
i=1 p
U
[2nRi ]
tends to zero, exponentially fast as 2−κn for some constant κ, as n
approaches infinity.
Proof. This follows from the proof of the OSRB theorem (Theorem 1 in [29]) with minor
modifications. Here we only mention how the proof should be modified without repeating
the entire proof. In our re-statement of the OSRB theorem above, we have used a notation
that is suitable for our purposes here, which is different from the one used in [29]. However,
just for the purpose of writing the modification that needs to be made in the proof given
in [29], we adopt the notation and definitions of [29]. We refer the reader to [29] for definition
of variables that we use below.
The proof begins by bounding the total variation distance between two distribution
with their fidelity (Lemma 7 of [29]). The paper then states that to show the expected total
variation distance goes to zero, it suffices to show that the corresponding expected fidelity
term goes to one as n goes to infinity. Now, to show that the total variation distance goes
to zero exponentially fast as 2−αn, it suffices to show that the “one minus the expected
fidelity term” goes to zero exponentially fast. This follows from the fact that if an arbitrary
sequence 1−fn tends to zero at least exponentially fast, then
√
1− f2n =
√
(1 − fn)(1 + fn)
also tends to zero exponentially fast.
This fidelity term is bounded from below in equation (104)-(106) as follows:
E
[
F (P (zn, b[1:T ]); p(z
n)pU (b[1:T ]))
]
≥ p(Anǫ )
√
1
1 +
∑
∅6=S⊆V 2
n(RS−H(XS |Z)+ǫ)
(25)
where ǫ is an arbitrary positive number and Anǫ is the weak typical set defined as follows:
Anǫ :=
{
(xn[1:T ], z
n) :
1
n
h(xn[1:T ]|z
n) ≥ H(X[1:T ]|Z)− ǫ,
}
. (26)
Now, since ǫ is fixed, we know that not only probability of i.i.d. Xn[1:T ], Z
n being typical
converges to one, but it also converges exponentially fast. We also have√
1
1 +
∑
∅6=S⊆V 2
n(RS−H(XS |Z)+ǫ)
≥
√
1−
∑
∅6=S⊆V
2n(RS−H(XS |Z)+ǫ) (27)
≥ 1−
∑
∅6=S⊆V
2n(RS−H(XS |Z)+ǫ), (28)
converges to one exponentially fast if for each S ⊆ [1 : T ] we have RS < H(XS |Z) − ǫ.
Therefore, both terms on the the right hand side of (25) converge to one exponentially fast.
Thus, their product also converges to one exponentially fast.
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We also need a linear version of the OSRB theorem. Assume that Mi’s are vectors
of symbols in a finite field F. Then, n i.i.d. repetitions of Mi, namely M
n
i can be also
understood as a (longer) sequence of symbols in F. Thus, a linear random binning of rate
Ri, namely Bi : M
n
i → M¯i = F
nRi
log |F| can be constructed as M¯i = AiM
n
i + Vi for some
random matrices Ai and vectors Vi with mutually independent and uniform entries. We
can now state the linear version of the OSRB theorem.
Theorem 6 (Linear OSRB). Assuming that Mi’s are vectors of symbols in a finite field,
Theorem 4 holds if we replace the general random binning with linear random binning.
Proof. The only place where random binning enters calculation in the proof of the OSRB
theorem in [29] are equations (94) and (98) in [29]. But (94) in [29] only uses the uniformity
condition which is valid for linear binning (equation (22)), and (98) in [29] only uses the
pairwise independence property that is also valid for linear binning (equation (23)).
A.3 Simulation from bin index
Assume that X is distributed uniformly on some alphabet set, and let Xn be an i.i.d.
repetitions of X. Let B = B(xn) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2nR − 1} be a random binning of Xn at rate
R. Given any particular realization of the binning, we end up with some joint distribution
pBXn where B is a function of X
n. From this joint distribution, we can consider the
conditional pmf pXn|B. Observe that multiple X
n may be mapped to B = b, hence, pXn|B
is not a deterministic channel. We now ask for the minimum random bit rate required
to simulate the channel pXn|B as defined by Steinberg and Verdu in [34]. In other words,
given input B of the channel pXn|B, we ask for the minimum number of uniformly random
bits (independent of input B) that we need to have to be able to accurately simulate the
channel pXn|B . In particular, if we denote the simulated channel by p˜Xn|B, we define the
total variation distance
‖pBpXn|B − pBp˜Xn|B‖1
as a measure of accuracy of channel simulation [34].
Observe that H(Xn|B) = H(Xn) −H(B) = n log |X | −H(B) ≥ n log |X | − nR. Intu-
itively speaking, to simulate conditional pmf pXn|B, we need a random source of average
rate log |X | −R. The following theorem shows that the rate log |X | −R+ δ (for any δ > 0)
is sufficient with high probability:
Theorem 7. Take some R < log |X | and δ > 0. Let T be a source of randomness, uniformly
distributed over an alphabet T satisfying 1
n
log |T | ≤ R˜ = log |X | − R + δ. Given any
realization of the binning, a deterministic simulation function φ(T,B) imposes the channel
p˜Xn|B(x
n|b) =
1
|T |
∑
t
1[φ(t, b) = xn],
Then, we claim one can find a deterministic simulation function φ for any realization of
the binning such that
EB‖PBPXn|B − PBP˜Xn|B‖1 ≤ 2
−ηn
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converges to zero exponentially fast in n for some η > 0. Here the expectation is taken over
all realizations of the binning. Furthermore, if the binning from Xn to B is linear, then one
can find a deterministic linear simulation function φ(T,B) satisfying the desired property.
Proof. Fix a realization of the binning mapping B. Since Xn is uniformly distributed, the
conditional distribution of Xn given B = b is also uniform over the set of sequences xn that
are mapped to B = b, i.e., {xn : B(xn) = b}. We can successfully simulate pXn|B=b if we
can choose a sequence xn uniformly at random from the set {xn : B(xn) = b}. This would
be possible if |{xn : B(xn) = b}| ≤ 2nR˜. Hence, the total variation distance can be bounded
from above as follows:
‖pBpXn|B − pBp˜Xn|B‖1 ≤
∑
b
pB(b)1[|{x
n : B(xn) = b}| > 2nR˜],
where we used the fact that when b is such that |{xn : B(xn) = b}| is large, the total
variation distance can be at most one. Thus, by taking average over all random binnings,
we have
EB‖PBPXn|B − PBP˜Xn|B‖1 ≤ PB,B[|{x
n : B(xn) = B}| > 2nR˜]
(a)
= PB[|{x
n : B(xn) = 1}| > 2nR˜].
where (a) follows from symmetry. Now, in a random binning, the number of sequences xn
that are mapped to bin index 1 has a Binomial distribution; we throw |X |n sequences and
each falls into the first bin with probability 2−nR. By Markov’s inequality, we obtain
PB[|{x
n : B(xn) = 1}| > 2nR˜] ≤
|X |n2−nR
2nR˜
= 2−nδ.
Finally, assume that the binning is linear, i.e., B = AXn + V for some matrices A and
V . Let the bin index B be a vector of symbols in F of length nR′ where R′ = Rlog |F| . The
set {xn : B(xn) = b} = {xn : Axn = b − V } is an affine linear subspace with dimension
Null(A) = n − Rank(A). This set can be written as Q(b − V ) + NT for some matrices
Q and N , and a uniformly distributed vector T whose length is equal to the dimension of
Null(A). If the rank of A is at least n(R′ − δlog |F|), the dimension of the null space will be
at most n(1− R′ + δlog |F|), and a randomness of size n(1− R
′) log |F| = n(log |X | − R + δ)
would suffice for channel simulation. Hence, the total variation distance can be bounded
from above as follows:
EB‖PBPXn|B − PBP˜Xn|B‖1 ≤ PB[Rank(A) < n(R
′ −
δ
log |F|
)]. (29)
However, for any R′ < 1, it is known that the probability that a random matrix AnR′×n
with uniform entries from F is not full rank vanishes exponentially fast in n; in fact this
probability is less than |F|−n(1−R
′)(|F| − 1)−1 [35, p.4]. This completes the proof for the
linear case.
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